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The receiver of an insolvent national bank may set off the claim against
a stockholder upon his stock against a dividend due the stockholder or
his assignee on the deposit account of the former.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The Fidelity National Bank of Cincinnati became insolvent
on June 21, 1887, and on June 27, 1887, Armstrong was
appointed by the Comptroller of the Currency receiver to wind
up its affairs. The bank was dissolved by decree 6f the Cir-
cuit Court on July.I2, 1887.
When the bank failed it owed Brownell a balance on his
deposit account of $3330.52, which, on July 30, 1887, he
assigned to King et al., who, on September 15th, made proof
'of their claim to the receiver and obtained a certificate from
him that they were creditors of the bank to the amount of
said balance. On November I, 1887, the comptroller declared
-a dividend of 25 per cent. on creditors' claims and issued
checks for the same, payable to the creditors. Among them
was a check for $832.63, the dividend on the plaintiff's claim.
The receiver refused to pay this over. At the time of the
failure of the bank, Brownell was owner of fifty shares of
stock in it. At the time of the issuance of the certificate of
indebtedness to the plaintiffs,'the receiver was not aware of
Bro~vnell's stock liability. The comptroller's checls were
issued with instructions not to deliver them to any one indebted
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to the bank, and he subsequently ordered the amount due on
all stock to be collected. Held, that Brownell's liability on
the stock could be set off against the dividend on the claim.
LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDERS IN INSOLVENT NATIONAL BANKS.
§ 515 1, U. S. Rev. Stat., provides that the "shareholders of
every national banking association shall be held individually
responsible, equally and ratably, and not one for another for
all contracts debts and engagements of such association to the
extent of the amount of their stock therein, at the par value
thereof, in addition to the amount invested in such shares."
§ 5234, U. S. Rev. Stat., provides that the Comptroller of
the Currency may, on becoming satisfied that a national bank
has refused its notes and is in default, forthwith appoint a
receiver, and "such receiver under the direction of the Comp-
troller shall take possession of the books, records and assets
of every description of such association, collect all debts, dues
and claims belonging to it, and upon the order of a court of
record of competent jurisdiction, may sell or compound all
bad or doubtful debts, and on a like order may sell all the
real and personal property of such association on such terms
as the court shall direct, and may, if necessary to pay the
debts of such association, enforce the individual liability of the
stockholders. Such receiver shall pay over all money so made
to the Treasurer of the United States subject to the order of the
comptroller, and shall also make report to the comptroller of
all his acts and proceedings."
§ I, Act of June 30, 1876, provides "that whenever any
national banking association shall be dissolved and its rights,
privileges and franchises declared forfeited as prescribed in
§ 5239 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, or when-
ever any creditor of any national banking association shall
have obtained a judgment against it in any court of record,
and made application, accompanied by a certificate from the
clerk of the court, stating that such judgment has been ren-
dered and has remained unpaid for the space of thirty days,
or whenever the Comptroller shall become satisfied of the
insolvency of the national banking association, he may after
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due examination of its affairs in either case appoint a receiver
who shall proceed to close up such association and enforce
the personal liability of the shareholders as provided in § 5234
of said statutes."
§ 2 of the same Act provides, "that when any national
banking association shall have gone into liquidation under the
provisions of § 5220 of said statutes, the individual liability of
the shareholders, provided for by § 5 15 1 of said statutes, may
be enforced by any creditor of such association by bill in equity
in the nature of a creditor's bill brought by such cieditor on
behalf of himself and of all other creditors of the association
against the shareholders thereof in any court of the United
States, having original jurisdiction in equity for the district in
which stich association may have been located or established."
These sections have been qpoted, at length, because the per-
sonal liability of a stockholder in either a nitional bank or any
corporation, apart from liability for unpaid stock, is purely
statutory and is commonly called the statutory liability. The
liability of a stockholder for unpaid subscriptions to stock is
another matter, and in the case of national banking associa-
tions, one that does not usually remain long in abeyance.
It will be seen, from the sections quoted, that the personal
liability of the shareholders where the other assets are insuffi-
cient for the payment of debts is an absolute one; that the
receiver is, in every case where a receiver is appointed at all,
the proper person, subject to the direction of the comptroller,
to enforce this liability; and that in the case of liquidation,
where no receiver is appointed by the comptroller, creditors'
bills are all6wed.
There is a clear distinction between national banking asso-
ciations and other corporations in the matter of the statutory
liability of stockholders, not so much in the purpose of this
liability as in its enforcement. The fund produced from the
enforcement of such liability is in all cases called a trust fund
for creditors. For national banks, however, in all cases of
insolvency, the receiver is the instrument by which it is pro-
duced; while for other corporations creditors' bills are the
means. It may be difficult to see why the proceeds of this
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statutory liability are any less a separate fund for the creditors
of a national bank than for those of another corporation,
except that Congress has provided but one pocket for the
stockholders' liability and the debts due the bank, while State
Laws generally have provided two.
In the principal case it was argued that the receiver's rights
to claim against debtors of his bank and against shareholders
were two distinct rights producing two distinct funds, and that
a claim against one of these funds was improperly opposed by
a claim due to the other. The court, however, took a differ-
ent view and after quoting the National Bank Acts, said:
"The receiver is authorized to collect from each stockholder
the necessary amount up to the full extent of his liability and
seems to be charged with that duty. The amount due from
the stockholders becomes assets to be administered by him as
the other assets of the bank in his hands; and all of the
assets, including the individual liability of the stockholders,
constitute a trust fund for the benefit of all creditors having
valid claims against the bank. It, therefore, becomes the duty
of the receiver, under the direction of the comptroller, to so
administer the fund as to secure to each beneficiary his just
proportion of it. In his trust capacity he is the representative
,of all the creditors and of the stockholders, both in the col-
lection of the assets and in their proper distribution; and the
fund collected from the stockholders goes into that arising
from the other assets and is distributed in the same way
to the creditors without separation or distinction on account
of the source from which it is derived. It altogether
constitutes one common fund for the equal benefit of
all the creditors according to their respective rights."
Usually the set off is claimed by the *creditor and the
receiver interposes the argument made use of by the creditor
in this case.
It would be perhaps as interesting to know why a distinc-
tion was ever made etveen a stockholder's liability on his
partially paid-up stock and his statutory liability in excess of
his stock, as to learn why, when the distinction was a settled
one, it should not be maintained, even though the funds from
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the two sources should be intermingled; as in the case of
national banks.
The capital stock of a corporation has many times been
called, whether rightly or wrongly, a trust fund for its credi-
tors: Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason, 3o8; -Thompson v. Reno
Savings Bank, 3 Am. St. Rep. 808; Sawyer v. Hoag, I7'Wall.
6Io; Hawley v. Upton, 1O2 U. S. 314; 25 Am. Law Review,
749; 25 Am. Law Rev. 940; Hostes v. Car Co., 50 N. W.
Rep. 1117; .32 Am. Law Reg. 175.
Notwithstanding the alleged peculiar character of capital
stock "especially unpaid subscriptions," such a claim is
enforceable by the corporatior itself, is an asset of the cor-
poration, and passes by assignment to the receiver or assignee
for creditors of the corporation. On the other hand a claim
against the corporation cannot be set off against a claim for
unpaid subscriptions, because the fruits of the latter are said
to be a trust fund for all the creditors ratably. In other
words, the stockholder's claim as a creditor is primarily against
all of the assets of the corporation except its capital stock.
To make a'set off valid, the debts must be mutual and in the
same right: Sawyer v. Hoag, supra, and, according to that
case, a common debt due by a corporation and a debt due to
it under a contract. of stock subscription, although enforceable
by it, are not owing in the same right, because the latter debt
is part of a "trust fund:" Cook on Stock and Stockholders,
§ 193.
The proceeds resulting from the statutory liability also con-
stitute a trust fund "exclusively" for the creditors, differing
from the fund produced by the payment' of.unpaid subscrip--
tions in this, that the creditors may pursue their remedies
directly against the stockholders; and, as a corollary to
this position, that the proceeds collected under-the statutory
liability do not form any part of the assets of the corporation,
and, on its insolvency, do not pass to the receiver or assignee
for creditors, and neither the corporation nor the receiver or
assignee can enforce this liability: Thompson v. Reno
Savings Bank, 3 Am. St. Rep. 846; Cook on- Stock and
Stockholders, § 218.
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It might innocently be supposed that a fund provided so
exclusively for creditors would be hopelessly infected by the
trust fund theory, and that, whatever might be the opinion as.
to the right of set off against the fund of unpaid subscriptions,
there could be no such right against the fund derived from
the statutory liability; for assuming this latter fund to be what
it is called, the debt of the corporation to the stockholder, and
his statutory liability are not owing either between the same-
parties or in the same right. Yet, strange to say, the law,
seems to be otherwise: Thompson v. Reno Bank, 3 Am. St.
Rep. 871; Cook on Stock and Stockholders, § 225 c.
It may be added that the principles of set off apply in all
cases except in suits on stock subscriptions.
There is then this peculiar state of affairs (I) a creditor sued
for an unpaid subscription or any other debt by a solvent
corporation may set off his claim against the corporation ;
(2) he may not s~t off such claim after the corporation has
failed, because the stock, "especially unpaid subscriptions,'"
has suddenly become a trust fund; (3) although the fund
derived from stockholders' statutory liability is also a trust
fund, yet the creditor may set off his claim against it
Do the. principles applicable to corporations in generat
apply to national banks? The question raised in the principal
case is peculiar. From the partially collected assets a divi-
dend was declared in favor of a stockholder who sued for it.
The set off was his statutory liability. Presumably the case
would have been the same had the receiver sued on the
statutory liability and the shareholder set off the dividend.
And yet he could not have set off another claim against the-
bank: Witters v. Sowles, 32 Fed. Rep. 13o-8; Delano v.
Butler," 1I8 U. S. 634.
IThis proposition may be somewhat too broadly stated, and may the
stockholder always set off his claim? Does not the solution of the
question lie in the terms of the statutes imposing this statutbry liability,
viz: If the statutes impose this liability ratably for all creditors, then the
stockholder can not, upon insolvency, obtain a preference by setting off
the individual indebtedness to himself, but must resort to his propor-
tionate dividend; while, on the other hand, if the liability imposed is
personal, special or limited, then the stockholder who is a creditor has
as much right to be preferred by retaining an amount which he could
have recovered by action, as has" any other creditor who sues therefor.
A. T. F.
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The court took two positions (I) that the argument based
on the trust fund theory was untenable in the case of a national
bank, and (2) the trust fund theory as declared in Sawyer v.
Hoag did not apply because the set off did not withdraw any
undue amount from the trust fund: Sowles.v.kWitters, 40 Fed.
Rep. 413. If the first position was sound, the second posi-
tion wi'as evasive and unnecessary.
Was the first position sound? The court practically
admitted that it could not be done in case of another corpora-
tion, and made the distinction that the statutory liability on
national bank stock is collectible by the receiver,--all of the
assets of the bank being mingled in his hands.. But the
general assets of another corporation are mixed with the pro-
ceeds of the unpaid capital and yet the courts seem to have no
difficulty in keeping them separate by means of the trust fund
theory. The capital of a national bank is, after the first six
months of its existence, always nominally full paid, so that
suits on stock subscriptions are usually on the statutory
liability; and if the law applicable to general corporations
were applied to national banks, it might well be contended
that a set off could be maintained, because the liability is the
statutory liability. The United States courts, however, seem
wedded to their idols, -and adhere to the trust fund theory for
all stock liability. The point was distinctly raised in Witters
v. Sowles, 32 Fed. Rep. 138, and the court there held that
the assessment is due the receiver only for the purpose of
ratable distribution among them. The case of Delano v.
Butler there cited in support of this position, was decided on
the ground that the claim was not a valid .one, not that it
could not have been set off if it had beerf valid, although the
facts would seem to have warranted this latter.
Because of such irreconcilable authority it is difficult to for-
mulate any rule on the subject. So far as the general liability
of stockholders in national banks is concerned the statutes do
not leave much room for difference, and the same thing may be
said 'of the method of its enforcement. As to the mutual
rights of the parties in suits on stock, the law is not clear, but
the weight of authority seems to be that the stock and the
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proceeds from statutory liability of the stockholders together
form a trust fund for creditors, which cannot be participated in
by them, directly or indirectly, until the assets of the bank are
all collected, and then only in the proportion of their proven
claims. This is of course contrary to the general principles
of set off; indeed the whole position in not in close accord
with any general principles, but seems based on a set of rules
framed for the special purpose. The law which will permit a
set off against a solvent corporation suing on its stock sub-
scriptions because the debts are in the same right, and will
not permit it after the corporation has become insolvent,
because the same debts are not in the -same right; which will
refuse a set off against a receiver because the debts are not in
the same right, but will permit the receiver to have set off a divi-
dend on the debt against the claim on the stock, because the
-dividend and the claim on the stock are in the same right, while
"the debt itself and the claim on the stock are not: such a law may
work justice sometimes and be firmly established, but certainly
does not commend itself for consistency. L. L. SMITH.
NOTE BY A. T. FREEDLEY, ESQ.
The alleged inconsistency pointed out in the concluding
paragraphs of the above article is probably more illusory than
real. In actions for stock subscriptions, set off is allowed when
the corporation is solvent, because the debts are due to and
from the corporation, and, primnafacie, the fund is not needed
for the payment of creditors. It is refused when the corpora-
tion is insolvent, because although one debt is duefrom the
corporation, yet the counter debt is due to another set of
parties, viz: the creditors of the corporation whose rights
thereto vest upon insolvency. The same doctrines govern
attempted off-sets of debts due by the corporation in actions
by receivers for subscriptions, but a set off of declared dividends
is allowed in actions by and against the receiver, inasmuch as
both debts are due to and by the declarant, viz: the receiver.
If a debtor when sued should, on general principles, be refused
the right to set off a declared dividend in his favor the incon-
sistency would be real; but I do not at present recall such a case.
